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1. Introduction
Over the past two decades, substantial research by financial economists in
government and academia from all over the world has gone into evaluating the
efficiencies of financial institutions.  Berger and Humphrey (1997) survey 130 studies
that apply frontier efficiency analysis to financial institutions in 21 countries.  The vast
majority of these studies were published in the 1990s, highlighting the importance and
greater frequency of this research in recent years.
Not coincidentally, this research and literature has expanded and evolved at a time
of great change in world financial markets.  A number of forces have fundamentally
changed the world in which financial services providers compete, including technology,
regulations, and economic changes.  For U.S. commercial banks, recent years have
witnessed sweeping changes in the regulatory environment, huge growth in off-balance
sheet risk management financial instruments, the introduction of e-commerce and on-line
banking, and significant financial industry consolidation.  All of these forces have made
the U.S. banking industry highly competitive.
In competitive industries, production units can be separated by some standard into
those that perform relatively well and those that perform relatively poorly.  Financial
economists have done this “separation” by applying nonparametric and parametric
frontier efficiency analyses.  Berger and Humphrey explain that information obtained
from such studies can be used for a variety of reasons.  They can inform government
policy by assessing the effects of various regulatory changes on efficiency.  Research
issues can be addressed by describing the efficiency of an industry.  Additionally,2
managerial performance can be improved by identifying “best practices” and “worst
practices” associated with high and low efficiency, respectively.
Success in competitive markets demands achieving the highest levels of
performance through continuous improvement and learning.  Comparative analyses and
benchmarking information can alert institutions to new paradigms and new practices,
leading to significant increases in firm efficiency and effectiveness.  Frontier analysis
methodologies are essentially sophisticated ways to benchmark institutions to determine
the relative performance or efficiency among competing firms.  Such analyses can
identify best practice institutions and provide a numerical efficiency score and ranking
for each institution that can be useful to policymakers, industry analysts, and
management of competing firms.
In this paper, we use a constrained-multiplier, input-oriented data envelopment
analysis (DEA) model to quantifiably benchmark the productive efficiency of U.S.
commercial banks.  Using the parsimonious DEA model developed by Siems and Barr
(1998), we measure relative productive efficiency of these institutions over the 15-year
period from 1984 to 1998.   We find strong and consistent relationships between
efficiency and our inputs and outputs, as well as independent measures of bank
performance.  Further, our results suggest that the impact of varying economic conditions
is mediated to some extent by the relative efficiencies of the banks that operate in these
conditions.  Finally, we find a close relationship exists between efficiency and soundness
as determined by bank examiner ratings.3
2. The efficiency of financial institutions
The financial institution efficiency literature is now both large and recent.  Berger
and Humphrey (1997) report that of the 130 studies that apply frontier analysis to
determine financial institution efficiency, 116 were published from 1992 to 1997.  Berger
and Humphrey also report that there are now enough frontier analysis studies to draw
some tentative comparisons of average efficiency levels both across measurement
techniques and across countries, as well as outline the primary results of the many
applications of efficiency analysis to policy and research issues.  They find that overall,
depository financial institutions￿banks, savings and loans, and credit
unions￿experience annual average technical efficiency ratios of around 77 percent
(median 82 percent).
1   Frontier inefficiency, sometimes called X-inefficiency, at
financial institutions has generally been found to consume a considerable portion of
costs, to be a much greater source of performance problems than either scale or product
mix inefficiencies, and to have a strong empirical association with higher probabilities of
failures (see Bauer et al., 1998).
Previous studies have examined efficiency and associated effects on financial
institution performance from several different perspectives.  These include the effects of
mergers and acquisitions (see Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan, 1999, and Resti, 1998),
institution failure (see Barr, Seiford, and Siems, 1993, and Cebenoyan, Cooperman, and
Register, 1993), and deregulation issues (see Humphrey and Pulley, 1997, and DeYoung,
1998), among many others.  Frontier efficiency models are employed by these
researchers over other performance indicators primarily because these models result in an
                                                       
1 A 77 percent efficiency measure typically means that if the average firm were producing on the frontier instead of at its current
location, then only 77 percent of the resources currently being used would be necessary to produce the same output (or meet the same
objectives).4
objectively determined quantified measure of relative performance that removes the
effects of many exogenous factors.  This permits the researcher to focus on quantified
measures of costs, inputs, outputs, revenues, profits, etc. to impute efficiency relative to
the best practice institutions in the population.
There are at least four frontier analysis methodologies used to compute financial
institution efficiency, and there is no consensus among researchers on which method is
best.  The approaches differ mainly in how they handle random error and their
assumptions regarding the shape of the efficient frontier.  The three main parametric
methodologies include the stochastic frontier approach (SFA), the thick frontier approach
(TFA), and the distribution-free approach (DFA).  In general, parametric approaches
specify a functional form for the cost, profit, or production relationship among inputs,
outputs, and environmental factors, and allow for random error.  The main nonparametric
approach is data envelopment analysis.  Originally developed by Charnes, Cooper, and
Rhodes (1978), DEA computes the relative technical (or productive) efficiency of
individual decision-making units by using multiple inputs and multiple outputs.
DEA has proven to be a valuable tool for strategic, policy, and operational
problems, particularly in the service and nonprofit sectors.  Its usefulness to
benchmarking is adapted here to provide an analytical, quantitative benchmarking tool
for measuring relative productive efficiency.  That is, DEA generally focuses on
technological, or productive, efficiency rather than economic efficiency.
Productive efficiency examines levels of inputs relative to levels of outputs.  To
be productively efficient, a firm must either maximize its outputs given its input
quantities, or minimize its inputs given outputs.  Economic efficiency is somewhat5
broader in that it involves optimally choosing the levels and mixes of inputs and/or
outputs based on reactions to market prices.  To be economically efficient, a firm seeks to
optimize some economic goal, such as cost minimization or profit maximization.  In this
sense, economic efficiency requires both productive efficiency and allocative efficiency.
As discussed in Bauer et al. (1998), it is quite plausible that some productively
efficient firms are economically inefficient, and vice versa.  Such efficiency mismatches
depend on the relationship between managers’ abilities to utilize the best technologies
and their abilities to respond to market signals.  Productive efficiency requires only input
and output data, whereas economic efficiency also requires market price data.  Allocative
efficiency is about doing things right, and economic efficiency is about doing the right
things right.  DEA was developed specifically to measure relative productive efficiency,
which is our focus here.
3. Mathematical foundations for DEA
DEA generalizes the Farrell (1957) single-output/single-input technical efficiency
measure to the multiple-output/multiple-input case.  DEA optimizes on each individual
observation with the objective of calculating a discrete piecewise linear frontier
determined by the set of Pareto-efficient decision making units (DMUs).  Using this
frontier, DEA computes a maximal performance measure for each DMU relative to all
other DMUs.  The only restriction is that each DMU lie on the efficient (extremal)
frontier or be enveloped within the frontier.  The DMUs that lie on the frontier are the
best practice institutions and retain a value of one; those enveloped by the extremal6
surface are scaled against a convex combination of the DMUs on the frontier facet closest
to it and have values somewhere between 0 and 1.
Several different mathematical programming DEA models have been proposed in
the literature (see Charnes et al., 1994).  Essentially, these various models each seek to
establish which of n DMUs determine the envelopment surface, or best practice
efficiency frontier.  The geometry of this envelopment surface is prescribed by the
specific DEA model employed.
To guide this discussion, first assume that there are n banks to be evaluated.  Each
bank utilizes varying amounts of m different inputs to produce s different outputs.
Specifically, bank j uses amounts Xj = {xij} of inputs i = 1,...,m and produces amounts Yj
= {yrj} of outputs r = 1,...,s.  We assume that the observed values are positive, so that xij >
0 and yrj > 0.  The s · n matrix of output measures is denoted by Y and the m · n matrix of
input measures is denoted by X.
We use a constrained-multiplier, CCR input-oriented DEA model to reduce the
multiple-input, multiple-output situation for each bank to a scalar measure of efficiency
(see Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes, 1978).  Consider the following ratio form of the
model:
max  EFFk = (3urkyrk)/( 3vikxik)
subject to: (3urkyrj)/( 3vikxij)  #  1;  j=1,...,n.                                       (1)
                    3urk  >  0;  r=1,...,s.
                    3vik  >  0;  i=1,...,m.
     0  >  0.7
This model evaluates the relative efficiency of bank k based on the performance
of j=1,...,n banks in the population, where the yrj and xij variables in the model represent
the observed amounts of the r
th output and the i
th input, respectively, of the j
th bank.
Thus, the multiple-input/multiple-output ratio being maximized in the objective function
provides a measure of relative productive efficiency that is a function of the multipliers.
The multipliers are the unit weights for each of the outputs and inputs, designated by urk
and vik, respectively.  These are the decision variables in the model, so that the objective
function seeks to maximize the ratio of the total weighted output of bank k divided by its
total weighted input.  For the constrained multiplier model, these weights must be within
an established range specified by the analyst.  The 0 > 0 in the model represents a non-
Archimedean constant that is smaller than any positive-valued real number.
Each bank’s maximum efficiency score will be less than or equal to 1 by virtue of
the constraints.  A value of EFFk = 1 represents full efficiency and it follows that bank k
is a “best practice” bank.  When EFFk < 1, then some level of inefficiency is present.
These efficiency values provide not only a way to benchmark productive efficiency, but
also make it possible to identify the sources and amounts of inefficiency in each input
and output for every unit being evaluated (see Bowlin, 1998).
The fractional linear programming problem presented above can be transformed
into an equivalent ordinary linear programming problem following Charnes and Cooper
(1962).  The results of this transformation, which are described in Charnes, Cooper, and
Rhodes (1978) results in the following linear programming problem:
max EFFk = 3urkyrk
subject to: 3urkyrj – 3vikxij  #  0                                                               (2)8
           3vikxik  =  1
                                                           -urk  #  -0
-vik  #  -0
This formulation, while equivalent to the fractional problem presented earlier, can
be interpreted as maximizing the sum of the weighted outputs (virtual output) for bank k
subject to unit virtual input for bank k while maintaining the condition that virtual output
cannot exceed virtual input for any bank.  Charnes et al. (1985) note that this implies the
conditions for Pareto optimality.  That is, further increases in this value can be attained
only if some of the xij inputs are increased or if some of the yrj outputs are decreased.
4. Data and model specification
We use year-end data for U.S. commercial banks from 1984 to 1998.  To evaluate
productive efficiency, we incorporate the constrained-multiplier, input-oriented DEA
model described in Siems and Barr (1998).  This five-input, three-output model captures
the essential financial intermediation functions of a bank and uses variables employed in
similar studies (see Berger and Mester, 1997).  Essentially, the model approximates the
bank management decision-making process by incorporating the necessary input
allocation and product mix decisions needed to attract deposits and make favorable loans
and investments.
The five inputs generally represent resources required to operate a bank: salary
expense, premises and fixed assets, other noninterest expense, interest expense, and
purchased funds (which are large dollar deposits).  The three outputs primarily represent9
desired outcomes: earning assets, interest income, and noninterest income.  Greater detail
on the variable definitions is given in Table 1.
Using this model, banks allocate resources and control internal processes by
effectively managing their employees, facilities, expenses, and sources and uses of funds
while working to maximize earning assets and total income.  Banks that do this best (the
best practice banks) are on the efficient frontier.  Banks with too much input or too little
output relative to some subset of their peers, are productively inefficient to some extent.
As stated earlier, we employ a constrained-multiplier model which requires that
the weights (the urk’s and vik’s) be within some prescribed range.  These upper and lower
bounds were determined through a survey of experienced bank examiners regarding their
knowledge of factors that are important in judging bank management quality.
2  The
survey was intended to identify the correct set of the most important inputs and outputs,
and then evaluate the importance of each variable in relation to the others.  Examiners
were asked “Which of the given list of criteria are most important in judging and
influencing the quality of bank management?”
The “given list of criteria” referenced the five inputs and three outputs used in our
model.  Table 2 shows the upper and lower bounds on the values of the multipliers that
were established from the survey based on an average of the relative scores given by the
bank examiners.  As shown, four of the five publicly available input variables used in our
model have relatively equal importance; only premises/fixed assets has a much lower
average weight range.  For the three publicly available output variables, earning assets is
clearly the most important, followed by interest income and then noninterest income.
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5. Hypotheses
Our overall hypothesis in this study is that more efficient institutions differ
significantly from less efficient institutions (as determined by our DEA model) in
measurable ways, and these results can be used for benchmarking.  As one would expect,
some measurable differences should manifest themselves particularly in the DEA
model’s inputs and outputs.  But we also expect to see differences in a variety of bank
performance measures and between strong and weak institutions as determined by bank
examiner ratings.  Specifically, we anticipate that the differences between more efficient
institutions and less efficient institutions would tend to be those summarized in Table 3.
That is, for the inputs and outputs utilized in our model, we expect that more efficient
institutions should tend to have lower expenses, fixed assets, purchased funds,
nonperforming loans, and loans-to-assets.  More efficient institutions should also tend to
have higher income, earning assets, and return on average assets.  Further, more efficient
institutions should be stronger institutions as determined by bank examiner ratings.
An added benefit of the sequential nature of our data is to enable a rudimentary
longitudinal analysis of efficiency using these inputs, outputs, and related measures.  The
15-year range of our data (1984-1998) subsumes periods that were both profitable and
difficult for financial institutions in the United States.  We are also interested to see if
these changing conditions have different impacts on the performance measures of
institutions of varying efficiencies.  Our overall hypothesis in this regard is that more
difficult banking conditions would tend to exacerbate the differences between more and
less efficient institutions, while improved conditions would close the gap between
efficiency levels.11
To examine the data across time, we designate the first eight years of our study as
“bad” years in the financial services industry, and the final seven years as “good.”  This
delineation is admittedly subjective.  There is not a universally accepted indicator of good
and bad conditions.  Further, the conditions varied extensively by geographic region, with
the downturn coming at different times to different areas of the country.  In the end, we
base our consideration of “good” and “bad” years on several factors.  In past analyses,
Bean et al., (1998) identified the five-year period between 1988 and 1992 as being the
height of the crisis of bank and savings and loan failures as shown in Figure 1.   We
expand this range to begin in the year when total FDIC- and FSLIC-insured failures first
achieved a sustained annual level of more than 100 (i.e., 1984).  Additional adjustments
are made to the endpoint of this range based on our data.  The overall return on average
assets (ROAA) of our efficiency-determined quartile data was 0.9.  We found that the
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average ROAA in each of the years from 1984-1991 was less than 0.9, and that the
average in each of the years from 1992-1998 was greater than 0.9.  We therefore use
1991-1992 as the arbitrary but functional “bad-to-good” turning point.  The use of these
ranges has the added benefit of bisecting our data into groups of similar size.
6. Model results
Our DEA model was applied to publicly available year-end data reported by U.S.
commercial banks from 1984 through 1998.  This 15-year range witnessed a wide variety
of economic climates, in which the banking industry experienced both difficult and
profitable periods.  For the purposes of our analysis, de novo institutions (defined as those
institutions that were less than three years old) are not included, as such institutions tend
to have cost structures that differ significantly from more established institutions (see
DeYoung, 1998).  Also excluded are banks that reported nonpositive values for any of the
input or output measures,
3 as such values are frequently indicative of reporting error or
anomalous operation.
To isolate the relative input and output characteristics of banks for further
analysis, the banks that met our criteria are separated into quartiles by their derived
efficiency score.  These four groups serve as the basis for our comparison of more and
less efficient banks vis-à-vis the DEA models’ individual inputs (salary expense, fixed
assets, other noninterest expense, interest expense, purchased funds) and outputs (earning
assets, interest income and noninterest income).  To control for banks of varying sizes,
we employ a weighted ratio for each of the eight components using the appropriate asset
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measure: quarter-end assets for balance sheet-related items (fixed assets, purchased funds
and earning assets) and average assets for the remaining income and expense-related
items.  Additionally, we analyze the four groups of institutions using three general
measures of bank performance: return on average assets, the ratio of nonperforming loans
to gross loans, and the ratio of gross loans to total assets.
An important concern at the outset of this study was to evaluate the reliability of
the DEA model over time, i.e., does the efficiency score perform as a consistent measure?
A t-test of the scores reveals that in each year of the study the differences between means
of the most efficient group and the least efficient group are significant at the 0.01 level,
suggesting a level of differentiation that permits us to regard differences between the
efficiency-ranked quartiles as meaningful.  As shown in Figure 2, this level of statistical
significance is also observed when comparing the means of each adjacent efficiency
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score quartile, suggesting that our convention of quartile-based analysis is also
appropriate.
4
An analysis by average asset size also reveals interesting differences between
efficiency groups.  In each year of the study, the smallest institutions are most efficient,
and the largest are least efficient, as displayed in Figure 3. Further, the relative positions
of the means of the second and third quartiles remain statistically significant and rank-
distinct
5 across the 15 years of the study.  This result seems to underscore the potential
for greater inefficiencies in the operation of larger, more complex organizations.
                                                       
4 When reviewing data based on efficiency scores it is important to bear in mind that the DEA model derives an efficiency score for a
particular institution relative to other institutions in a finite reference group.  The score therefore cannot be generalized to periods or
institutions external to the original reference group, i.e., scores cannot be compared year to year: a score of 0.8 in one year is not
necessarily more efficient than a score of 0.4 the following year.
5 Quartile data are rank-distinct in a given period if the four groups of dependent variables remain distinct and congruent with the
independent variable across that time, e.g., the institutions in the lowest efficiency score-based quartile have the highest average salary
expense, the adjacent efficiency score quartile has the second highest average salary expense, etc.
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Efficiency scores of banks rated as strong and weak by examiners also exhibit
significant differences across the study.  As shown in Figure 4, in each year, “strong”
institutions (those with composite CAMELS ratings of “1” or “2”) are significantly more
efficient than “weak” institutions (rated “3”, “4”, or “5”).  These results, discussed in
greater detail below, are consistent with the expectation that efficiency and perceived
soundness are covariants.
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6.1 Input and output measures
6.1.1 Salary expense
Institution efficiency is a reliable covariant with asset-weighted salary expense for
the first eleven years of our study: across that time, the most efficient institutions incur
significantly lower salary expenses than the least efficient institutions as shown in Figure
5.   From 1984 through 1998, salary expense as a percentage of average assets at the most
efficient institutions trends gradually upward while the same ratio at the least efficient
institutions moderates downward slightly.  In 1995, the difference between the two means
is no longer significant; by 1997, the averages for the two groups slip by each other.  In
1997 and 1998, the most efficient banks have higher salary expenses than the least
efficient banks; in 1998, the difference between the two was significant at the 0.05 level.
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The first eleven years seem consistent with our hypothesis: the most efficient banks were
the ones that were the best at containing costs, in this case, salary expenses.  The last four
years’ results are less clear.  It may be that in 1995-1998 the more efficiently managed
institutions started paying higher salaries to attract and retain better qualified employees
in a more competitive labor environment.
6  At the same time, the lack of growth in mean
adjusted salary expense among less efficient institutions may be indicative of efforts to
contain or attempt to reduce expenses in order to improve operating efficiencies and
profitability.
6.1.2 Fixed assets
As shown in Figure 6, in each of the 15 years, the most efficient banks have
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civilian labor force in mid-1992 to 4.3 percent by the end of 1998.
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significantly lower fixed asset levels than do the least efficient banks.  From 1984 to 1998
the difference between the means of the fixed asset ratios of the most and least efficient
banks narrows from 1.07 percent of assets to 0.41 percent of assets, but the difference
remains statistically significant.  In fact, from 1984 through 1992 the differences between
each quartile are significant at the 0.01 level.  From 1993 through 1998 these differences
deteriorate initially for the third most efficient quartile, and then for the second most
efficient quartile as well, making this measure much less differentiating of efficiency.
From 1993 to 1998, fixed assets as a percentage of total assets increase an average of 2.7
percent for the three most efficient quartiles, while it decreases 0.3 percent for the least
efficient quartile.  These results are consistent with our expectation that the minimization
of fixed (non-earning) assets is among the characteristics that distinguish more efficient
institutions.
6.1.3 Other noninterest expense
Other noninterest expense (comprised of noninterest expenses excluding salary
expenses) also evidences a strong relationship with our efficiency measure. As shown in
Figure 7, the quartile of least efficient banks has significantly higher noninterest expenses
than the most efficient banks for all 15 years.  Further, the differences between the means
of all four quartiles remain statistically significant at at least the 0.05 level.  The mean
differences are also rank-distinct across the 15 years of the study.   Although the
difference between most and least efficient quartiles trends moderately toward zero,
improving conditions do not seem to have a dramatic effect on other noninterest
expenses.19
6.1.4 Interest expense
As shown in Figure 8, no completely consistent relationship is evident between
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efficiency and interest expense, although there appears to be a slight tendency for less
efficient banks to have higher interest expenses.  The difference in interest expense
between the most and least efficient quartiles is statistically significant at the 0.01 level in
13 of the 15 years.  In ten of these years, the less efficient institutions incur higher
average interest expenses than their most efficient counterparts; in the other three years
(1986, 1992, and 1993), less efficient banks actually incur significantly lower average
interest expenses than the most efficient banks in the study.  Although failing to be
completely consistent, the results overall seem to indicate the highly competitive nature
of banks’ interest rate management.  With very few exceptions, year-to-year changes in
interest expense move in the same direction for each quartile for each year of the study.
7
Contrary to our expectations, more and less efficient banks become more distinct
on the interest expense measure after the 1991-1992 “bad-to-good conditions” change.
This may be driven in some degree by movement in the purchased funds measure
(discussed in the following section) which follows a similar course.
6.1.5 Purchased funds
In our study, the level of an institution’s purchased funds is inversely related to
efficiency.  In each year, purchased funds for the least efficient quartile exceeds that of
the most efficient quartile by a significant difference, as shown in Figure 9.   The
differences for each quartile are clearly rank-distinct.  Indeed, purchased funds in the
least efficient quartile are always significantly greater than purchased funds in the
adjacent (next-most-efficient) quartile.  A gross, overall summary of the 15 years of data
                                                       
7 There were three exceptions to this pattern: in 1990 interest expense increased for the most efficient quartile while declining in the
others, in 1994 interest expense increased for the least efficient quartile contrary to the other quartiles, and in 1998 interest expense
declined slightly for one of the quartiles while the other quartiles increased.21
indicates that the least efficient banks, on average, have year-end purchased funds
equaling 23.3 percent of their total assets; the same ratio for the adjacent quartile and the
most efficient quartile is 12.3 percent and 3.5 percent, respectively.  This may reflect
unwillingness or difficulty on the part of less efficient institutions to access less costly
sources of funds (e.g., core deposits).
When examining changes over time, more and less efficient banks become more
distinct on this measure after the 1991-1992 “bad-to-good conditions” change.  The
difference between the adjusted level of purchased funds of the most and least efficient
quartiles declines steadily from 1986 to 1992, and rises steadily in each subsequent year.
This trend implies more efficient banks are better able (relative to less efficient banks) to
utilize less expensive sources of funds in improving economic conditions.
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6.1.6 Earning assets
As Figure 10 shows, the differences in earning assets between efficiency quartiles
are dynamic over time.  In each year, the least efficient institutions have significantly
lower levels of earning assets than the most efficient institutions.  Here again, the
efficiency score-derived quartiles yield average earning asset levels that were rank-
distinct.  These relationships persist even as the average earning asset level of all four
quartiles improves over time, from 88.7 percent of total average assets in 1984 to 92.0
percent in 1998.  The least efficient quartile experiences the greatest improvement,
increasing from 86.4 percent in 1984 to 91.7 percent in 1998.  By comparison, the most
efficient quartile increases its percentage of earning assets from 90.4 to 92.3 across the
same period.  While the difference between the most and least efficient quartiles steadily









1984* 1985* 1986* 1987* 1988* 1989* 1990* 1991* 1992* 1993* 1994* 1995* 1996* 1997* 1998*
* indicates years where most-to-least efficient difference is significant at the 1% level
most efficient 3rd quartile 2nd quartile least efficient23
declines over time, the relative movement of the earning assets levels for all of the
quartiles generally improves.
6.1.7 Interest income
Interest income, an output in our DEA model, exhibits characteristics similar to
the related input factor interest expense.  As shown in Figure 11, there appears to be no
consistent relationship between efficiency and interest income.  However, of the 15 years
under study, the difference between the most and least efficient quartiles is significant in
eight years.  In six of these eight years the most efficient group has higher interest income
than the least efficient group.
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If interest income and interest expense are considered together, an interesting
pattern emerges from 1994 to 1998.  Across these five years, the relationship between
efficiency and interest expense, after having fluctuated considerably, seems to settle into
a pattern where the most efficient institutions report consistently and significantly lower
interest expenses than the least efficient institutions.  During the same time period,
however, interest income is actually greater in the least efficient quartile than the most
efficient quartile, although the differences failed to reach the 0.01 level of significance
8.
These results are congruent with a scenario wherein less efficient institutions make
significantly greater recourse to purchased funds (discussed above) on the expense side,
while having a significantly higher percentage of their asset portfolios composed of loans
(discussed below), which tend to carry greater risk and greater interest return than other
assets.
The longitudinal interaction between the weighted interest income levels of the
most and least efficient quartiles is difficult to characterize.  The five-year period
identified as the height of the banking crisis (1988-1992) witnesses two of the three years
of greatest difference in interest income between the most and least efficient quartiles.  In
1989, the least efficient quartile has the higher interest income level, and in 1992 the
most efficient quartile has the higher interest income level.  After 1994, however, the
differences between the two quartiles on this measure tend toward zero.
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6.1.8 Noninterest income
Noninterest income is another highly reliable covariant with measured efficiency.
In each year of our study, the least efficient institutions have significantly higher
noninterest income levels (measured as the ratio of noninterest income to average assets)
than the most efficient institutions as shown in Figure 12.  This measure also yields
results that are consistently rank-distinct.
9  This finding suggests that less efficient
institutions are more willing to increase earnings by emphasizing this output. This
difference is significant: in our study noninterest income averages 1.40 percent of
average assets for the least efficient banks, and 0.68 percent for the most efficient banks.
                                                       
9 Data for the most efficient quartile in 1989 reflect the removal of two institutions whose reported results were highly anomalous and
skewed the data.
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6.2 Bank performance measures
6.2.1 Return on average assets
As shown in Figure 13, return on average assets (ROAA) is positively related to
our efficiency measure.  In each year of our study, the differences in ROAA between the
most efficient and least efficient groups are significant at the 0.01 level.  Moreover, in
each year, ROAA for each of the efficiency score-based quartiles remains rank-distinct.
ROAA is also a good barometer of the effect that the banking crisis in the 1980s
had on banks of varying efficiencies.  The three most efficient quartiles reach their lowest
average ROAA in 1986, when average ROAA for the least efficient banks drops just
below zero.  In 1987, as the first three quartiles’ averages begin to rebound, the average
for the least efficient group slides further to –0.17 percent.  From this low, ROAA for the
least efficient quartile begins to climb, slowly closing the gap with the other three groups.
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From a maximum deficit of 109 basis points below the most efficient quartile in 1987,
average ROAA at the least efficient banks climbs to within 15 basis points in 1994, and
averages a difference of 18 basis points from 1994 through 1998.
Perhaps the least efficient banks have the most room for improvement, which
enables them to impact their situation more effectively and recover more ground as
banking conditions improve.  Moreover, as the banking industry consolidated and
became more competitive, the differences in performance between the most and least
efficient banks would be expected to narrow.
6.2.2 Nonperforming loans to gross loans
The percentage of gross loans that are nonperforming reflects a strong difference
between relatively efficient and inefficient banks across varying industry conditions.  As
shown in Figure 14, nonperforming loans in 1984 account on average for 2.58 percent of
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gross loans for the most efficient quartile of banks, compared to 2.88 percent for the least
efficient banks.  The gap between the two widens with the declining conditions for banks
until 1987, when nonperforming loans are on average 2.35 percent of gross loans for the
most efficient banks, compared to 3.69 percent for their least efficient counterparts.
From 1984 through 1993 the difference between the most and least efficient banks
is statistically significant at the 0.01 level, the most efficient institutions having a much
lower level of nonperforming loans.  After 1987, the gap between the two begins to
narrow, with the nonperforming loan ratio decreasing at a faster rate at less efficient
institutions than at more efficient institutions.  By 1994, the difference is no longer
statistically significant, a condition which persists through the end of the study period in
1998.
6.2.3 Loan to asset ratio
The ratio of loans to total assets shows a significant difference between the least
and most efficient quartiles, with the least efficient group having a higher concentration
of loans as shown in Figure 15.  If a higher loan-to-asset ratio is related to a bank’s
willingness to take on additional risk, these findings are consistent with the view that less
efficient institutions are less risk averse than their more efficient counterparts.  This may
also indicate greater attempts by less efficient banks to improve their operating
efficiencies and profitability by increasing revenues through riskier ventures.
Considered over time, these results suggest a banking market that is on the whole
growing more amenable to risk, or perhaps better able to manage and control risk through
other channels (e.g., financial derivatives and other risk management practices).  The two
most efficient quartiles reach their lowest loan-to-asset ratio in 1987, after which the29
percentage of their assets held as loans increases.  The two least efficient quartiles both
reach their lowest loan-to-asset ratio in 1993, and increase afterward.  It may be that the
upward trend by all four groups, and the fact that the loan-to-asset ratios of the second
and third quartiles exceed the least efficient quartile’s ratio in 1997 and 1998, indicate
improved risk management practices and a highly competitive environment.
6.3 Examiner ratings
In the early 1970s regulators of federal financial institutions, realizing the
advantages of a standardized framework for the examination process, developed a rating
system whereby the most critical components of a financial institution’s overall safety
and soundness could be identified, measured, and quantified.  In 1979, the Uniform
Financial Institutions Rating System was adopted.  Commonly referred to by the acronym
of its component parts, the CAMEL rating, the outcome of an on-site examination of a
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financial institution, has become a concise and indispensable tool for examiners and
regulators.






Note: In 1997, a sixth component was added – Sensitivity to market risk
Each of the factors is scored from ‘one’ to ‘five’, with ‘one’ being the strongest
rating.  Additionally, a single composite CAMELS rating is determined from these
components, and represents the findings of the examination for the institution as a whole.
The Commercial Bank Examination Manual produced by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System describes the five composite rating levels as follows:
CAMELS = 1 An institution that is basically sound in every respect.
CAMELS = 2 An institution that is fundamentally sound but has moderate
weaknesses.
CAMELS = 3 An institution with financial, operational, or compliance
weaknesses that give cause for supervisory concern.
CAMELS = 4 An institution with serious financial weaknesses that could
impair future viability.
CAMELS = 5 An institution with critical financial weaknesses that render
the probability of failure extremely high in the near term.
Research involving efficiency and CAMELS ratings is somewhat limited, due in
large part to the restricted nature of the ratings themselves.
10  DeYoung (1998), using the
management component of the rating, found that, when comparing well and poorly
                                                       
10 The CAMELS rating of an institution is held in strictest confidence by regulators.  The composite rating is divulged only to the
management of the examined entity; the six component ratings are kept internal to the regulatory agencies.31
managed banks, well-managed banks had lower estimated unit costs and higher raw
(accounting-based) unit costs, suggesting that cost-efficient management does involve
expenditures that poorly managed banks tend to fail to make.
We evaluate our DEA results against the CAMELS ratings of banks from 1984
through 1998, anticipating that more efficient institutions would tend to have higher
CAMELS ratings than less efficient institutions.  CAMELS ratings, assigned by
examiners at the end of an on-site examination, are “snapshot” evaluations of a given
bank at a given point in time, and are thus perishable quantities (see Cole and Gunther,
1995).  Given the dynamic nature of the financial industry, the underlying factors on
which the ratings are based begin to change in some ways immediately after the rating is
given.  An example of this might be a poorly rated institution that begins immediately to
implement directives for improvement imposed by its examiners.  We therefore wanted
to carefully match our year-end data with CAMELS ratings, ensuring that each was
pertinent and referred to “the same bank.”
To do this, we limit the CAMELS portion of our analysis to banks that received a
rating within a twelve-month window beginning six months before the year-end data
under consideration.  To compensate for the fact that in many years there are too few
institutions with lower ratings to construct a statistically adequate sample, we divide the
ratings into two groups.  Institutions with composite ratings of “1” or “2” are considered
strong banks and institutions with composite ratings of “3”, “4”, or “5” are considered
weak banks.  As shown in Figure 4 (earlier in the text), banks with strong CAMELS
ratings have significantly higher efficiency scores than banks with weak ratings.  This
relationship was constant across all 15 years in the study.32
7. Conclusion
In this study, we employ a constrained-multiplier, input-oriented DEA model to
evaluate the relative productive efficiency of U.S. commercial banks across a 15-year
period.  The DEA model offers numerous benefits, including the ability to target areas of
relative efficiency between banks.  Perhaps most importantly, it allows analysis of
multiple aspects of a financial institution’s performance, unlike more common
benchmarking methodologies that focus on only one of many interrelated measures at a
time.  DEA creates an analysis that is broader without sacrificing depth of insight, an
analysis that is more pertinent and hence applicable to the real-world operations of
complex financial institutions.
We divide commercial banks into quartiles based on their DEA-derived efficiency
score, and find that in each year of our 15-year review each quartile has significantly
higher efficiency scores than the quartile beneath it.  A similar, rank-distinct relationship
is discovered between efficiency quartiles on the weighted measures of noninterest
income, other noninterest expense, and purchased funds (all three inversely related to
efficiency), as well as earning assets and return on average assets (both positively related
to efficiency).  The relationship between efficiency and interest income and expense is
not as pervasive, perhaps as a result of market competition, but there is still a noticeable
tendency for efficiency to be positively correlated with interest income and negatively
related to interest expense.  There is also a strong negative relationship between the most
efficient and least efficient quartiles of banks on the percentage of assets that were fixed
assets and the percentage of total assets that were loans.33
The level of nonperforming loans to total loans is significant and negatively
related to the efficiency scores of the most and least efficient quartiles from 1984 through
1993.  The relationship of efficiency to salary expense is similar from 1984 through 1994.
It is likely that nonperforming loans and salary expense lose their predictive power vis-à-
vis efficiency as a result of the same external forces: the improving economy, improving
conditions of financial institutions after the difficulties of the 1980s, and financial
industry consolidation.
We examine the change in our independent variables over time, particularly
noting the change in the difference between the most and least efficient quartiles.  We
find that only return on average assets, the ratio of nonperforming loans-to-gross loans,
and the relative level of purchased funds seem to be impacted by improved economic
conditions.  The “most-efficient-to-least-efficient” differences of the other variables in
the study seem to trend across the 15-year period independent of economic conditions.
Consistent with previous research, we find a significant relationship between
CAMELS ratings and efficiency scores: institutions rated by examiners as the strongest
have higher efficiency scores than those institutions rated as the weakest in each year of
our study.  This finding suggests that DEA might be a useful off-site bank surveillance
tool to monitor banks between on-site examinations.
DEA represents a potential for significant advance in the comparative analysis of
financial institutions.  Limited until fairly recently by the lack of affordable, large scale
computational resources, frontier estimation techniques such as DEA offer analysts the
ability to appreciate an organization in greater depth by enabling the concurrent study of
the multiple variables that impact a firm’s efficiency, and hence its competitiveness,34
potential, and even viability.  As already noted, DEA models can be used to develop off-
site monitoring tools for use by regulators and examiners.  Banks can employ such
models internally to benchmark their own processes, finding potential areas for
improvement as well as gauging the potential and efficacy of their efforts as they operate
in an industry which is increasingly characterized by accelerating change and
competition.  Finally, industry analysts and policymakers can use DEA as a powerful tool
for understanding more about the behavior of institutions and markets in this rapidly
changing and increasingly complex industry.35
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Table 1
Variable Definitions
Call Report Item Code
INPUTS
Salary Expense RIAD4135
Premises and Fixed Assets RCFD2145
Other Noninterest Expense RIAD4093 – RIAD4135
Interest Expense RIAD4073
Purchased Funds
* RCFD0278 + RCFD0279 + RCON2840 +
RCFD2850 + RCON6645 + RCON6646
OUTPUTS
Earning Assets
** RCFD2122 – (RCFD1407 + RCFD1403) +




* Purchased Funds are federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreement to
repurchase, demand notes issued to the U.S. Treasury, other borrowed money, time
certificates of deposit of $100,000 or more, and open-account time deposits of $100,000
or more.
** Earning Assets are total loans less loans past due 90 days or more and loans in
nonaccrual status, plus total securities, interest-bearing balances, federal funds sold and
securities purchased under agreements to resell, and assets held in trading accounts.38
Table 2
Constraints for the Multipliers (Weights) in the DEA Model
 Lower Bound Upper Bound
Inputs
Salary Expense       15.8%        35.9%
Premises/Fixed Assets         3.1%        15.7%
Other Noninterest Expense       15.8%        35.9%
Interest Expense          17.2%        42.8%
Purchased Funds       12.1%        34.0%
Outputs
Earning Assets       40.9%        69.5%
Interest Income       25.7%        46.9%
Noninterest Income                 10.2%        20.2%39
Table 3
     Hypotheses: Relative Characteristics of More Efficient Banks
Characteristic More Efficient Institutions Less Efficient Institutions
Salary expense Lower Higher
Other noninterest expense Lower Higher
Noninterest income Higher Lower
Interest expense Lower Higher
Interest income Higher Lower
Fixed assets Lower Higher
Earning assets Higher Lower
Purchased funds Lower Higher
ROAA Higher Lower
Nonperforming loans Lower Higher
Loans to assets Lower Higher
CAMELS ratings Stronger Weaker